$ R9 i5 h% l% K 总而言之，中国的崛起可以是和平的，但是这种结果远非板上钉钉。与标准的现实主义观点桕左，国际体系制造的基本压力将不会迫使美国和中国发生冲突。核武器、太平洋的阻隔以及曰前还算相对良好的政治关系应该会让两国维持高度的安全状态并避免推行使两国关系极为紧绷的军事政策。美国面临的挑战将是：在不那么重大的利益（比如台湾地区）或许会引发问题的情形下，调整政策，确保自己不夸大中国口益增强的实力和军力所带来的风险。 ' H& Y0 z+ N" n% j$ L( o . m5 ?3 d g4 d7 _- l$ LWill China's Rise Lead to War? 1 x N' }9 N2 p- d3 `; iWhy Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism By Charles Glaser March/April 2011" a/ M1 `9 K) U
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Realist international relations theorists usually would predict that the basic pressures of the international system will force the United States and China into conflict. But properly understood, realism offers grounds for optimism in this case, so long as Washington can avoid exaggerating the risks posed by China's growing power. : R& y" _2 @! G" ]3 a, W$ j ' Y5 e9 D1 L3 I: U" oCHARLES GLASER is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. This essay draws on his recent book Rational Theory of International Politics.& K) m4 A% z6 C+ e
$ `: L+ p' I* l& E% j! [# g. bThe rise of China will likely be the most important international relations story of the twenty-first century, but it remains unclear whether that story will have a happy ending. Will China's ascent increase the probability of great-power war? Will an era of U.S.-Chinese tension be as dangerous as the Cold War? Will it be even worse, because China, unlike the Soviet Union, will prove a serious economic competitor as well as a geopolitical one? " t1 u3 ?+ d2 @2 ?2 U5 G: J6 w * _) R+ k2 O+ G4 z6 h% {These issues have been addressed by a wide range of experts -- regionalists, historians, and economists -- all of whom can claim insight into certain aspects of the situation. But China's unique qualities, past behavior, and economic trajectory may well turn out to be less important in driving future events than many assume -- because how a country acts as a superpower and whether its actions and those of others will end in battle are shaped as much by general patterns of international politics as by idiosyncratic factors. Such broader questions about the conditions under which power transitions lead to conflict are precisely what international relations theorists study, so they, too, have something to add to the discussion.! s6 C5 n3 ^3 q# A: X2 c, Z
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So far, the China debate among international relations theorists has pitted optimistic liberals against pessimistic realists. The liberals argue that because the current international order is defined by economic and political openness, it can accommodate China's rise peacefully. The United States and other leading powers, this argument runs, can and will make clear that China is welcome to join the existing order and prosper within it, and China is likely to do so rather than launch a costly and dangerous struggle to overturn the system and establish an order more to its own liking.$ \+ z5 a: k$ [8 P3 B
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The standard realist view, in contrast, predicts intense competition. China's growing strength, most realists argue, will lead it to pursue its interests more assertively, which will in turn lead the United States and other countries to balance against it. This cycle will generate at the least a parallel to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, and perhaps even a hegemonic war. Adherents of this view point to China's recent harder line on its maritime claims in the East China and South China seas and to the increasingly close relations between the United States and India as signs that the cycle of assertiveness and balancing has already begun. 1 u3 G) s' `" @8 z1 ]4 H4 M+ q: Z$ u6 k9 [& U+ p
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